We present a second iteration of a machine learning approach to static code analysis and fingerprinting for weaknesses related to security, software engineering, and others using the open-source MARF framework and the MARFCAT application based on it for the NIST's SATE IV static analysis tool exposition workshop's data sets that include additional test cases, including new large synthetic cases. To aid detection of weak or vulnerable code, including source or binary on different platforms the machine learning approach proved to be fast and accurate to for such tasks where other tools are either much slower or have much smaller recall of known vulnerabilities. We use signal and NLP processing techniques in our approach to accomplish the identification and classification tasks. MARFCAT's design from the beginning in 2010 made is independent of the language being analyzed, source code, bytecode, or binary. In this follow up work with explore some preliminary results in this area. We evaluated also additional algorithms that were used to process the data.
Introduction
This is a follow up work on the first incarnation of MARFCAT detailed in [Mok10d, Mok11] . Thus, the majority of the results content here addresses the newer iteration duplicating only the necessary background and methodology information (reduced). The reader is deferred to consult the expanded background information and results in that previous work freely accessible online (and the arXiv version of that is still occasionally updated).
We elaborate on the details of the expanded methodology and the corresponding results of application of the machine learning techniques along with signal and NLP processing to static source and binary code analysis in search for weaknesses and vulnerabilities. We use the tool, named MARFCAT, a MARF-based Code Analysis Tool [Mok13] , first exhibited at the Static Analysis Tool Exposition (SATE) workshop in 2010 [ODBN10] to machine-learn from the (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) CVE-based vulnerable as well as synthetic CWE-based cases to verify the fixed versions as well as non-CVE based cases from the projects written in same programming languages. The 2 nd iteration of this work was prepared based on SATE IV [ODBN12] and uses its updated data set and application. On the NLP side, we employ simple classical NLP techniques (n-grams and various smoothing algorithms), also combined with machine learning for novel non-NLP applications of detection, classification, and reporting of weaknesses related to vulnerabilities or bad coding practices found in artificial constrained languages, such as programming languages and their compiled counterparts. We compare and contrast the NLP approach to the signal processing approach in our results summary and illustrate concrete results and for the same test cases.
We claim that the presented machine learning approach is novel and highly beneficial in static analysis and routine testing of any kind of code, including source code and binary deployments for its efficiency in terms of speed, relatively high precision, robustness, and being a complimentary tool to other approaches that do in-depth semantic analysis, etc. by prioritizing those tools' targets. All that can be used in automatic manner in distributed and scalable diverse environments to ensure the code safety, especially the mission critical software code in all kinds of systems. It uses spectral, acoustic and language models to learn and classify such a code.
This document, like its predecessor, is a "rolling draft" with several updates expected to be made as the project progresses beyond SATE IV. It is accompanied with the updates to the open-source MARFCAT tool itself [Mok13] .
Organization
The related work, some of the present methodology is based on, is referenced in Section 2. The data sets are described in Section 3. The methodology summary is in Section 4. We present some of the results in Section 5 from the SAMATE reference test data set. Then we present a brief summary, description of the limitations of the current realization of the approach and concluding remarks in Section 6. In the Appendix there are classification result tables for specific test cases illustrating top results by precision.
Related Work
To our knowledge this was the first time a machine learning approach was attempted to static code analysis with the first results demonstrated during the SATE2010 workshop [Mok10d, Mok13, ODBN10] . In the same year, a somewhat similar approach independently was presented [BSSV10] for vulnerability classification and prediction using machine learning and SVMs, but working with a different set of data.
Additional related work (to various degree of relevance or use) is further listed (this list is not exhaustive). A taxonomy of Linux kernel vulnerability solutions in terms of patches and source code as well as categories for both are found in [MLB07] . The core ideas and principles behind the MARF's pipeline and testing methodology for various algorithms in the pipeline adapted to this case are found in [Mok08b, Mok10b] as it was the easiest implementation available to accomplish the task. There also one can find the majority of the core options used to set the configuration for the pipeline in terms of algorithms used. A binary analysis using machine learning approach for quick scans for files of known types in a large collection of files is described in [MD08] . This includes the NLP and machine learning for NLP tasks in DEFT2010 [Mok10c, Mok10a] with the corresponding DEFT2010App and its predecessor for hand-written image processing WriterIdentApp [MSS09] . Tlili's 2009 PhD thesis covers topics on automatic detection of safety and security vulnerabilities in open source software [Tli09] . Statistical analysis, ranking, approximation, dealing with uncertainty, and specification inference in static code analysis are found in the works of Engler's team [KTB + 06, KAYE04, KE03] . Kong et al. further advance static analysis (using parsing, etc.) and specifications to eliminate human specification from the static code analysis in [KZL10] . Spectral techniques are used for pattern scanning in malware detection by Eto et al. in [ESI + 09] . Some researchers propose a general data mining system for incident analysis with data mining engines in [IYE + 09]. Hanna et al. describe a synergy between static and dynamic analysis for the detection of software security vulnerabilities in [HLYD09] paving the way to unify the two analysis methods. Other researchers propose a MEDUSA system for metamorphic malware dynamic analysis using API signatures in [NJG + 10]. Some of the statistical NLP techniques we used, are described at length in [MS02] . BitBlaze (and its web counterpart, WebBlaze) are other recent types of tools that to static and dynamic binary code analysis for vulnerabilities fast, developed at Berkeley [Son10a, Son10b] . For wavelets, for example, Li et al. [LjXP + 09] have shown wavelet transforms and k-means classification can be used to identify communicating applications on a network fast and is relevant to our study of the code in any form, text or binary.
Data Sets
We use the SAMATE data set to practically validate our approach. The SAMATE reference data set contains C/C++, Java, and PHP language tracks comprising CVE-selected cases as well as stand-alone cases and the large generated synthetic C and Java test cases (CWE-based, with a lot of variants of different known weaknesses). SATE IV expanded some cases from SATE2010 by increasing the version number, and dropped some other cases (e.g., Chrome).
The C/C++ and Java test cases of various client and server OSS software are compilable into the binary and object code, while the synthetic C and Java cases generated for various CWE entries provided for greater scalability testing (also compilable). The CVE-selected cases had a vulnerable version of a software in question with a list of CVEs attached to it, as well as the most known fixed version within the minor revision number. One of the goals for the CVE-based cases is to detect the known weaknesses outlined in CVEs using static code analysis and also to verify if they were really fixed in the "fixed version" [ODBN12] . The cases with known CVEs and CWEs were used as the training models described in the methodology. The summary below is a union of the data sets from SATE2010 and SATE IV. The preliminary list of the CVEs that the organizers expect to locate in the test cases were collected from the NVD [NIS13a, ODBN12] for Wireshark 1.2.0, Dovecot, Tomcat 5.5.13, Jetty 6.1.16, and Wordpress 2.0. The specific test cases with versions and language at the time included CVE-selected:
• C: Wireshark 1.2.0 (vulnerable) and Wireshark 1.2.18 (fixed, up from Wireshark 1.2.9 in SATE2010)
• C: Dovecot (vulnerable) and Dovecot (fixed) originally non-CVE selected in SATE2010:
• C: Dovecot
• Java: Pebble 2.5-M2
Synthetic CWE cases produced by the SAMATE team:
• C: Synthetic C covering 118 CWEs and ≈ 60K files
• Java: Synthetic Java covering ≈ 50 CWEs and ≈ 20K files
Methodology
In this section we outline the methodology of our approach to static source code analysis. Most of this methodology is an updated description from [Mok10d] . The line number determination methodology is also detailed in [Mok10d, ODBN10] , but is not replicated here. Thus, the methodology's principles overview is described in Section 4.1, the knowledge base construction is in Section 4.2, machine learning categories in Section 4.3, and the high-level algorithmic description is in Section 4.4.
Methodology Overview
The core methodology principles include:
• Machine learning and dynamic programming
• Spectral and signal processing techniques
• NLP n-gram and smoothing techniques (add-δ, Witten-Bell, MLE, etc.)
We use signal processing techniques, i.e. presently we do not parse or otherwise work at the syntax and semantics levels. We treat the source code as a "signal", equivalent to binary, where each n-gram (n = 2 presently, i.e. two consecutive characters or, more generally, bytes) are used to construct a sample amplitude value in the signal. In the NLP pipeline, we similarly treat the source code as a "characters", where each n-gram (n = 1..3) is used to construct the language model.
We show the system the examples of files with weaknesses and MARFCAT learns them by computing spectral signatures using signal processing techniques or various language models (based on options) from CVE-selected test cases. When some of the mentioned techniques are applied (e.g., filters, silence/noise removal, other preprocessing and feature extraction techniques), the line number information is lost as a part of this process.
When we test, we compute either how similar or distant each file is from the known trained-on weakness-laden files or compare trained language models with the unseen language fragments in 5 the NLP pipeline. In part, the methodology can approximately be seen as some fuzzy signaturebased "antivirus" or IDS software systems detect bad signature, except that with a large number of machine learning and signal processing algorithms and fuzzy matching, we test to find out which combination gives the highest precision and best run-time.
At the present, however, we are looking at the whole files instead of parsing the finer-grain details of patches and weak code fragments. This aspect lowers the precision, but is relatively fast to scan all the code files.
CVEs and CWEs -the Knowledge Base
The CVE-selected test cases serve as a source of the knowledge base to gather information of how known weak code "looks like" in the signal form [Mok10d] , which we store as spectral signatures clustered per CVE or CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration). The introduction by the SAMATE team of a large synthetic code base with CWEs, serves as a part of knowledge base learning as well. Thus, we:
• Teach the system from the CVE-based cases
• Test on the CVE-based cases
• Test on the non-CVE-based cases For synthetic cases we do similarly:
• Teach the system from the CWE-based synthetic cases
• Test on the CWE-based synthetic cases
• Test on the CVE and non-CVE-based cases for CWEs from synthetic cases
We create index files in XML in the format similar to that of SATE to index all the file of the test case under study. The CVE-based cases after the initial index generation are manually annotated from the NVD database before being fed to the system. The script that does the initial index gathering in the OSS distribution of MARFCAT is called collect-files-meta. pl written in Perl. The synthetic cases required a special modification to that resulting in collect-files-meta-synthetic.pl where there are no CVEs to fill in but CWEs alone, with the auto-prefilled explanations since the information in the synthetic cases is not arbitrary and controlled for identification.
Categories for Machine Learning
The tow primary groups of classes we train and test on include are naturally the CVEs [NIS13a, NIS13b] and CWEs [VM13] . The advantages of CVEs is the precision and the associated meta knowledge from [NIS13a, NIS13b] can be all aggregated and used to scan successive versions of the the same software or derived products (e.g., WebKit in multiple browsers). CVEs are also generally uniquely mapped to CWEs. The CWEs as a primary class, however, offer broader categories, of kinds of weaknesses there may be, but are not yet well assigned and associated with CVEs, so we observe the loss of precision. Since we do not parse, we generally cannot deduce weakness types or even simple-looking aspects like line numbers where the weak code may be. So we resort to the secondary categories, that are usually tied into the first two, which we also machine-learn along, such as issue types (sink, path, fix) and line numbers. 
Algorithms
In our methodology we systematically test and select the best (a tradeoff between speed and accuracy) combination(s) of the algorithm implementations available to us and then use only those for subsequent testing. This methodology is augmented with the cases when the knowledge base for the same code type is learned from multiple sources (e.g., several independent C test cases).
Signal Pipeline
Algorithmically-speaking, the steps that are performed in the machine-learning signal based analysis are in Figure 1 . The specific algorithms come from the classical literature and other sources and are detailed in [Mok08b] and the related works. To be more specific for this work, the loading typically refers to the interpretation of the files being scanned in terms of bytes forming amplitude values in a signal (as an example, 8kHz or 16kHz frequency) using either unigram, bi-gram, or tri-gram approach. Then, the preprocessing allows to be none at all ("raw", or the fastest), normalization, traditional frequency domain filters, wavelet-based filters, etc. Feature extraction involves reducing an arbitrary length signal to a fixed length feature vector of what thought to be the most relevant features are in the signal (e.g., spectral features in FFT, LPC), min-max amplitudes, etc. Classification stage is then separated either to train by learning the incoming feature vectors (usually k-means clusters, median clusters, or plain feature vector collection, combined with e.g., neural network training) or testing them against the previously learned models.
NLP Pipeline
The steps that are performed in NLP and the machine-learning based analysis are presented in Figure 2 . The specific algorithms again come from the classical literature (e.g., [MS02] ) and are detailed in [Mok10b] and the related works. To be more specific for this work, the loading typically refers to the interpretation of the files being scanned in terms of n-grams: uni-gram, bi-gram, or tri-gram approach and the associated statistical smoothing algorithms, the results of which (a vector, 2D or 3D matrix) are stored.
Binary and Bytecode Analysis
In this iteration we also perform preliminary Java bytecode and compiled C code static analysis and produce results using the same signal processing, NLP, combined with machine learning and data mining techniques. At this writing, the NIST SAMATE synthetic reference data set for Java and C was used. The algorithms presented in Section 4.4 are used as-is in this scenario with the modifications to the index files. The modifications include removal of the line numbers, source code fragments, and lines-of-text counts (which are largely meaningless and ignored. The byte counts may be recomputed and capturing a byte offset instead of a line number was projected. The filenames of the index files were updated to include -bin in them to differentiate from the original index files describing the source code. Another point is at the moment the simplifying assumption is that each compilable source file e.g., .java or .c produce the corresponding .class and .o files that we examine. We do not examine inner classes or linked executables or libraries at this point. Similarly test on the testing data for the same case (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Tomcat 5.5.13) without the annotations as a sanity check;
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Test on the testing data for the fixed case of the same software (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Tomcat 5.5.33);
20
Test on the testing data for the general non-CVE case (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Pebble or synthetic);
end
Figure 1: Machine-learning-based static code analysis testing algorithm using the signal pipeline
Wavelets
As a part of a collaboration project with Dr. Yankui Sun from Tsinghua University, waveletbased signal processing for the purposes of noise filtering is being introduced with this work to compare it to no-filtering, or FFT-based classical filtering. It's been also shown in [LjXP + 09] that wavelet-aided filtering could be used as a fast preprocessing method for a network application identification and traffic analysis [LKW08] . We rely in part on the the algorithm and methodology found in [AS01, SCL + 03, KBC05, KBC06] , and at this point only a separating 1D discrete wavelet transform (SDWT) has been tested (see Section 5.4.1).
Since the original wavelet implementation [SCL + 03] is in MATLAB [Mat12a] , [Sch07] , we used in part the codegen tool from the MATLAB Coder toolbox [Mat12b] , [Mat12c] Similarly test on the testing data for the same case (e.g., Tomcat 5.5.13 on Tomcat 5.5.13) without the annotations as a sanity check;
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end
Figure 2: Machine-learning-based static code analysis testing algorithm using the NLP pipeline a rough C/C++ equivalent in order to (manually) translate some fragments into Java (the language of MARF and MARFCAT). The specific function for up/down sampling used by the wavelets function in [Mot09] written also C/C++ was translated to Java in MARF as well with unit tests added.
Demand-Driven Distributed Evaluation with GIPSY
To enhance the scalability of the approach, we convert the MARFCAT stand-alone application to a distributed one using an eductive model of computation (demand-driven) implemented in the General Intensional Programming System (GIPSY)'s multi-tier run-time system [Han10, Ji11, Vas05, Paq09], which can be executed distributively using Jini (Apache River), or JMS [JMP13] .
To adapt the application to the GIPSY's multi-tier architecture, we create a problem-specific generator and worker tiers (PS-DGT and PS-DWT respectively) for the MARFCAT application. The generator(s) produce demands of what needs to be computed in the form of a file (source code file or a compiled binary) to be evaluated and deposit such demands into a store managed by the demand store tier (DST) as pending. Workers pickup pending demands from the store, and them process then (all tiers run on multiple nodes) using a traditional MARFCAT instance. Once the result (a Warning instance) is computed, the PS-DWT deposit it back into the store 9 with the status set to computed. The generator "harvests" all computed results (warnings) and produces the final report for a test cases. Multiple test cases can be evaluated simultaneously or a single case can be evaluated distributively. This approach helps to cope with large amounts of data and avoid recomputing warnings that have already been computed and cached in the DST.
The initial basic experiment assumes the PS-DWTs have the training sets data and the test cases available to them from the start (either by a copy or via an NFS/CIFS-mounted volumes); thus, the distributed evaluation only concerns with the classification task only as of this version. The follow up work will remove this limitation.
In this setup a demand represents a file (a path) to scan (actually an instance of the FileItem object), which is deposited into the DST. The PS-DWT picks up that and checks the file per training set that's already there and returns a ResultSet object back into the DST under the same demand signature that was used to deposit the path to scan. The result set is sorted from the most likely to the list likely with a value corresponding to the distance or similarity. The PS-DGT picks up the result sets and does the final output aggregation and saves report in one of the desired report formats (see Section 4.8 picking up the top two results from the result set and testing against a threshold to accept or reject the file (path) as vulnerable or not. This effectively splits the monolithic MARFCAT application in two halves in distributing the work to do where the classification half is arbitrary parallel.
Simplifying assumptions:
• Test case data and training sets are present on each node (physical or virtual) in advance (via a copy or a CIFS or NFS volume), so no demand driven training occurs, only classification
• The demand assumes to contain only file information to be examined (FileItem)
• PS-DWT assumes a single pre-defined configuration, i.e. configuration for MARFCAT's option is not a part of the demand
• PS-DWT assume CVE or CWE testing based on its local settings and not via the configuration in a demand
Export

SATE
By default MARFCAT produces the report data in the SATE XML format, according to the SATE IV requirements. In this iteration other formats are being considered and realized. To enable multiple format output, the MARFCAT report generation data structures were adapted case-based output.
Forensic Lucid
The first one, is Forensic Lucid, the author Mokhov's PhD topic, a language to specify and evaluate digital forensic cases by uniformly encoding the evidence and witness accounts (evidential statement or knowledge base) of any case from multiple sources (system specs, logs, human accounts, etc.) as a description of an incident to further perform investigation and event reconstruction. Following the data export in Forensic Lucid in the preceding work [MPD08, MPD10, Mok08a] we use it asa format for evidential processing of the results produced by MARFCAT.
The work [MPD08] provides details of the language; it will suffice to mention here that the report generated by MARFCAT in Forensic Lucid is a collection of warnings as observations with the hierarchical notion of nested context of warning and location information. These will form an evidential statement in Forensic Lucid. The example scenario where such evidence compiled via a MARFCAT Forensic Lucid report would be in web-based applications and web browser-based incident investigations of fraud, XSS, buffer overflows, etc. linking CVE/CWE-based evidence analysis of the code (binary or source) security bugs with the associated web-based malware propagation or attacks to provide possible events where specific attacks can be traced back to the specific security vulnerabilities.
SAFES
The third format, for which the export functionality is not done as of this writing, SAFES, is the 3rd format for output of the MARFCAT. SAFES is becoming a standard to reporting such information and the SATE organizers began endorsing it as an alternative during SATE IV.
Experiments
The below is the current summary of the conducted experiments:
• Re-testing of the newer fixed versions such as Wireshark 1.2.18 and Tomcat 5.5.33.
• Half-based testing of the previous versions by reducing the training set by half and but testing for all known CVEs or CWEs for Wireshark 1.2.18, Tomcat 5.5.33, and Chrome 5.0.375.54.
• Testing the new test cases of Dovecot, Jetty 6.1.x, and Wordpress 2.x as well as Synthetic C and Synthetic Java.
• Binary test on the Synthetic C and Synthetic Java test cases.
• Performing tests using wavelets for preprocessing.
Results
The preliminary results of application of our methodology are outlined in this section. We summarize the top precisions per test case using either signal-processing or NLP-processing of the CVE-based and synthetic cases and their application to the general cases. Subsequent sections detail some of the findings and issues of MARFCAT's result releases with different versions. Some experiments we compare the results with the previously obtained ones [Mok10d] where compatible and appropriate. The results currently are being gradually released in the iterative manner that were obtained through the corresponding versions of MARFCAT as it was being designed and developed.
Preliminary Results Summary
The results summarize the half-training-full-testing data vs. that of regular ones reported in [Mok10d] .
• Wireshark -14 warnings; but it appears all quality or false positive -(very hard to follow the code, severely undocumented)
-none found during quick testing
• Dovecot 1.2.x: (ongoing of this writing)
• Jetty: (ongoing of this writing)
• Wordpress: (ongoing of this writing) What follows are some select statistical measurements of the precision in recognizing CVEs and CWEs under different configurations using the signal processing and NLP processing techniques.
"Second guess" statistics provided to see if the hypothesis that if our first estimate of a CVE/CWE is incorrect, the next one in line is probably the correct one. Both are counted if the first guess is correct.
A sample signal visiusalization in the middle of a vulnerable file packet-afs.c in Wireshark 1.2.0 to CVE-2009-2562 is in Figure 3 in the wave form. The low "dips" represent the text line endings (coupled with a preceding character (bytes) in bigrams (two PCM-signed bytes assumed encoded in 8kHz representing the amplitude; normalized), which are often either semicolons, closing or opening braces, brackets or parentheses). Only a small fragment is shown of roughly 300 bytes in length to be visually comprehensive of a nature of a signal we are dealing with.
In Figure 4 , there are 3 spectrograms generated for the same file packet-afs.c. 
Half-Training Data For Training and Full For Testing
This is one of the experiment per discussion with Aurelien Delaitre and SATE organizers. The main idea is to test robustness and precision of the MARFCAT approach by artificially reducing known weaknesses (their locations) to learn from by 50%, but test on the whole 100% to see how much does precision degrade with such a reduction. Specifically, we supply only CWE classes testing for this experiment (CVE classes make little sense). Only the first 50% of the entries entries were used for training for Wireshark 1.2.0, Tomcat 5.5.13, and Chrome 5.0.375.54, while the full 100% were used to test the precision changes. The below are the results.
It should be noted that CWE classification is generally less accurate due to a lot of dissimilar items "stuffed" (by NVD) into very broad categories such as NVD-CWE-Other and NVD-CWEnoinfo when the data were collected. Additionally, since we arbitrarily picked the first 50% of the training data, some of the CWEs simply were left out completely and not trained on if they were entirely in the omitted half, so their individual precision is obviously 0% when tested for.
The archive contains the .log and the .xml files (the latter for now are in SATE format only with the scientific notation +E3 removed). The best reports are:
report-cweidnoprepreprawfftcheb-wireshark-1.2.0-half-train-cwe.xml report-cweidnoprepreprawfftdiff-wireshark-1.2.0-half-train-cwe.xml
The experiments are subdivided into regular (signal) and NLP based testing. • SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve This is CVE-based classical signal classification.
A typical MARFCAT run. Tomcat 5.5.13 used for training. For most reports, no warnings were spotted based on what was learned from 5.5.13, so the reports convey earlier CVEs were fixed.
Empty reports like:
report-noprepreprawfftcheb-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve.xml
However, the -cos report is noisy and non-empty:
report-noprepreprawfftcos-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve.xml
Overly detailed log files are also provided.
• SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cwe This is classical CWE-based testing.
A typical MARFCAT CWE run. Tomcat 5.5.13 used for training.
No warnings found based on the CVE data learned.
Most of the reports are empty, e.g.:
report-nopreprepcharunigramadddelta-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve-nlp. xml
The -cos report is not as noisy as for CVEs, but still contains a couple of false positives.
report-cweidnoprepreprawfftcos-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cwe. xml
Overly detailed log files also provided.
Training and testing indexes are provided (*_test.xml and *_train.xml).
• SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve-nlp This is CVE-based NLP testing.
A typical MARFCAT NLP run. Tomcat 5.5.13 used for training. Usually a slow run, so only one configuration is tried. No warnings found based on the CVE data learned.
The only empty report is:
19 report-noprepreprawfftcos-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cve.xml
• SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cwe-nlp This is CWE-based NLP testing.
A typical MARFCAT CWE NLP run. Tomcat 5.5.13 used for training. Usually a slow run, so only one configuration is tried. No warnings found based on the CVE data learned.
report-cweidnopreprepcharunigramadddelta-train-test-test-run-quick-tomcat-5-5-33-cwe-nlp xml
• SATE-IV.2-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve Test Wireshark 1.2.18 using the training data from Wireshark 1.2.0 and classical CVEbased processing.
Majority of algorithms returned empty reports. -cos was as noisy as usual, but -mink was non-empty but quite short (though also presumed with false positives).
Empty reports:
report-noprepreprawfftcheb-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml report-noprepreprawfftdiff-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml report-noprepreprawffteucl-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml report-noprepreprawffthamming-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml
Non empty reports:
report-noprepreprawfftcos-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml report-noprepreprawfftmink-train-test-test-run-quick-wireshark-1-2-18-cve.xml
Verbose log files and input index files are also supplied for the most cases.
[TODO]
5.4 Version SATE-IV.5
Wavelet Experiments
The preliminary experiments using the separating discreet wavelet transform (DWT) filter are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3 for CVEs and CWEs respectively. For comparison, the low-pass FFT filter is used for the same as shown in Table 1 and Table 4 respectively. For the CVE experiments, the wavelet transforms overall produces better precision across configurations (larger number of configurations produce higher precision result) than those with the low-pass FFT filter. While the top precision result remains the same, it is shown than when filtering is wanted, the wavelet transform is perhaps a better choice for some configurations, e.g., from 4 and below as well as for the Second Guess statistics. The very top result for the CWE based processing so far exceeds the overall precision of separating DWT vs. low-pass FFT, which then drops below for the subsequent configurations. -cos was dropped from Table 3 for   20 technical reasons. In Figure 5 is a spectrogram with the SDWT preprocessing in the pipeline. More exploration in this area is under way for more advanced wavelet filters than the simple separating DWT filter as to see whether they would outperform -raw or not and at the same time minimizing the run-time performance decrease with the extra filtering. 
Conclusion
We review the current results of this experimental work, its current shortcomings, advantages, and practical implications.
Shortcomings
Following is a list of the most prominent issues with the presented approach. Some of them are more "permanent", while others are solvable and intended to be addressed in the future work. Specifically:
• Looking at a signal is less intuitive visually for code analysis by humans. (However, can produce a problematic "spectrogram" in some cases).
• Line numbers are a problem (easily "filtered out" as high-frequency "noise", etc.). A whole "relativistic" and machine learning methodology developed for the line numbers in [Mok10d] to compensate for that. Generally, when CVEs are the primary class, by accurately identifying the CVE number one can get all the other pertinent details from the CVE database, including patches and line numbers making this a lesser issue.
• Accuracy depends on the quality of the knowledge base (see Section 4.2) collected. Some of this collection and annotation is manual to get the indexes right, and, hence, error prone. "Garbage in -garbage out."
• To detect more of the useful CVE or CWE signatures in non-CVE and non-CWE cases requires large knowledge bases (human-intensive to collect), which can perhaps be shared by different vendors via a common format, such as SATE, SAFES or Forensic Lucid.
• No path tracing (since no parsing is present); no slicing, semantic annotations, context, locality of reference, etc. The "sink", "path", and "fix" results in the reports also have to be machine-learned.
• A lot of algorithms and their combinations to try (currently ≈ 1800 permutations) to get the best top N. This is, however, also an advantage of the approach as the underlying framework can quickly allow for such testing.
• File-level training vs. fragment-level training -presently the classes are trained based on the entire file where weaknesses are found instead of the known file fragments from CVE-reported patches. The latter would be more fine-grained and precise than whole-file classification, but slower. However, overall the file-level processing is a man-hour limitation than a technological one.
• Separating wavelet filter performance is rather adversely affects the precision to low levels.
• No nice GUI. Presently the application is script/command-line based.
Advantages
There are some key advantages of the approach presented. Some of them follow:
• Relatively fast (e.g., Wireshark's ≈ 2400 files train and test in about 3 minutes) on a now-commodity desktop or a laptop.
• Language-independent (no parsing) -given enough examples can apply to any language, i.e. methodology is the same no matter C, C++, Java or any other source or binary languages (PHP, C#, VB, Perl, bytecode, assembly, etc.) are used.
• Can automatically learn a large knowledge base to test on known and unknown cases.
• Can be used to quickly pre-scan projects for further analysis by humans or other tools that do in-depth semantic analysis as a means to prioritize.
• Can learn from SATE'08, SATE'09, SATE'10, and SATE IV reports.
• Generally, high precision (and recall) in CVE and CWE detection, even at the file level.
• A lot of algorithms and their combinations to select the best for a particular task or class (see Section 4.3).
• Can cope with altered code or code used in other projects (e.g., a lot of problems in Chrome were found it WebKit, used by several browsers).
Practical Implications
Most practical implications of all static code analyzers are obvious-to detect source code weaknesses and report them appropriately to the developers. We outline additional implications this approach brings to the arsenal below:
• The approach can be used on any target language without modifications to the methodology or knowing the syntax of the language. Thus, it scales to any popular and new language analysis with a very small amount of effort.
• The approach can nearly identically be transposed onto the compiled binaries and bytecode, detecting vulnerable deployments and installations-akin to virus scanning of binaries, but instead scanning for infected binaries, one would scan for security-weak binaries on site deployments to alert system administrators to upgrade their packages.
• Can learn from binary signatures from other tools like Snort [Sou13] .
• The approach is easily extendable to the embedded code and mission-critical code found in aircraft, spacecraft, and various autonomous systems.
Future Work
There is a great number of possibilities in the future work. This includes improvements to the code base of MARFCAT as well as resolving unfinished scenarios and results, addressing shortcomings in Section 6.1, testing more algorithms and combinations from the related work, and moving onto other programming languages (e.g., ASP, C#). Furthermore, foster collaboration with the academic, industry (such as VeraCode, Coverity) and government vendors and others who have vast data sets to test the full potential of the approach with the others and a community as a whole. Then, move on to dynamic code analysis as well applying similar techniques there. Other near-future work items include realization of the SVM-based classification, data export in SAFES and Forensic Lucid formats, a lot of wavelet filtering improvements, and distributed GIPSY cluster-based evaluation.
To improve detection and classification of the malware in the network traffic or otherwise we employ machine learning approach to static pcap payload malicious code analysis and fingerprinting using the open-source MARF framework and its MARFCAT application, originally designed for the SATE static analysis tool exposition workshop. We first train on the known malware pcap data and measure the precision and then test it on the unseen, but known data and select the best available machine learning combination to do so. This work elaborates on the details of the methodology and the corresponding results of application of the machine learning techniques along with signal processing and NLP alike to static network packet analysis in search for malicious code in the packet capture (pcap) data. malicious code analysis [BOB + 10, SEZS01, SXCM04, HJ07, HRSS07, Sue07, RM08, BOA + 07] We show the system the examples of pcap files with malware and MARFCAT learns them by computing spectral signatures using signal processing techniques. When we test, we compute how similar or distant each file is from the known trained-on malware-laden files. In part, the methodology can approximately be seen as some signature-based "antivirus" or IDS software systems detect bad signature, except that with a large number of machine learning and signal processing algorithms, we test to find out which combination gives the highest precision and best run-time. At the present, however, we are looking at the whole pcap files. This aspect lowers the precision, but is fast to scan all the files. The malware database with known malware, the reports, etc. serves as a knowledge base to machine-learn from. Thus, we primarily:
• Teach the system from the known cases of malware from their pcap data
• Test on the known cases
• Test on the unseen cases
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to express thanks and gratitude to the following for their help, resources, advice, and otherwise support and assistance:
• NIST SAMATE group
• Dr. Brigitte Jaumard 
A Classification Result Tables
What follows are result tables with top classification results ranked from most precise at the top. This include the configuration settings for MARF by the means of options (the algorithm implementations are at their defaults [Mok08b] ).
B Forensic Lucid Report Example
An example report encoding the reported data in Forensic Lucid for Wireshark 1.2.0 after using simple FFT-based feature extraction and Chebyshev distance as a classifier. The report provides the same data, compressed, as the SATE XML, but in the Forensic Lucid syntax for automated reasoning and event reconstruction during a digital investigation. The example is a an evidential statement context encoded for the use in the investigator's knowledge base of a particular case. 
